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Systematic analysis of U.S. capital markets reveals important empirical facts that 
analytical modeling or empirical research seeking to explain the 1998-2001 movements 
needs to recognize. There is no single “bubble point” at which U.S. capital markets had an 
epiphany that valuations required a sharp downward re-evaluation. Rather, different sectors 
had different points after which ex post sustained declines occurred. For the 
NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX public capital markets, the sustained ex post declines occurred 
starting in March 2000 for the computer software industry and in September 2000 for the 
computer hardware industry. Private venture capital investment in new ventures peaked in 
the March 2000 quarter for software and in the September 2000 quarter for hardware and 
communications. Four sectors exhibiting extreme price movements are identified – 
computer hardware, computer software, telecommunications, and biotech/pharmaceuticals. 
These sectors had observable characteristics prior to 1998 that implied higher risk – they 
had higher relative risk (CAPM beta), higher standard deviation of security returns, more 
extreme revenue growth increases (decreases) in the upper (lower) tails, and a higher 
propensity for negative net income. During the 1998-2001 period, companies in these 
sectors had abnormally high revenue growth rates. An Internet sample of companies 
exhibits even higher abnormal revenue growth rates relative to either prior periods or other 
companies in the 1998-2001 period. The large relative increases and decreases in the market 
capitalization of U.S. capital markets in 1998-2001 may well have more grounding in risk-
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Many colorful and emotive expressions have been used to describe the movements 
of stock prices in U.S. capital markets in the period 1998-2000. Phrases that appear with 
regularity include “bubble”, “bursting of the bubble”, “crash”, “Internet”, “boom and bust”, 
“dot-com bubble”, “spectacular rise and fall of NASDAQ”, and “technology bubble on 
NASDAQ.”
2 Likewise, the explanations/rationalizations that have been proposed to explain 
the phenomena have used similar terminology, such as “irrational exuberance,” “hedge 
funds riding the technology bubble, not attacking it”, “short term institutional trend-
chasing”, and “herding by institutional investors.”
3 
 
This paper examines the behavior of U.S capital markets during 1998-2001 through 
the lens of underlying company financial fundamentals. We examine the ability of company 
fundamentals to directionally explain changes in stock price levels. We analyze both U.S. 
public equity markets and U.S. private venture capital markets because many of the 
relatively young companies that reached $10 billion-plus market capitalizations in 1998-
2001 originated in the venture capital market.  
 
 
I. Overview of Existing Research 
 
The behavior of capital markets in the U.S. and other countries in the period 1998-
2001 has attracted a great deal of attention. To try to explain the general notion of a sizable 
rise and then relatively sharp fall in stock price levels, a diverse set of hypotheses have been 
put forward:  
 
                                                 
1 The research of Armstrong, Dávila, and Foster was supported by the Center for Entrepreneurial Studies 
(CES), Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.  We are grateful to VentureOne for generously 
providing us access to their valuation and financing database. 
2 These phrases appear with frequency. One source where each of these terms are used is: “Internet bubble and 
crash” in Sharma, Easterwood, and Kumar [2005, p. 1]; “the technology bubble on NASDAQ” in Brunermeier 
and Nagel [2003, Abstract]; “April [2000] saw the ‘bursting’ of the Internet bubble” in Battalio and Schultz 
[2004, p. 10]; “spectacular rise and fall of NASDAQ from September 99-2001” in Griffin, Harris, and 
Topaloglu [2003, Abstract]; “the dot com bubble” in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm [2003, p. 723]; “boom and bust” 
and “the Internet stock bubble” in Liu and Song [2001, p. 3]. 
3 Sources for phrases include: “irrational exuberance” in Shiller [2005] and Greenspan, A. [1996]; “hedge 
funds riding the technology bubble, not attacking it” in Brunermeier and Nagel [2004, p.2014]; “short term 
institutional trend-chasing” in Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu [2003, Abstract]; “herding by institutional 




•  Investor-related explanations. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu [2003, p. 4] argue that 
“institutions contributed more than individuals to the NASDAQ rise and fall…our 
evidence is most consistent with models where smart money follows past stock price 
movements leading to larger stock price bubbles than would exist in their absence.” 
Sharma, Easterwood, and Kumar [2005, p. 50] probe the hypothesis that “Institutional 
investors as a group herded into Internet stocks during the overall bubble period (Jan. 
98 – Mar. 00) and herded out of these stocks during the overall crash period (Apr. 00 
– Dec. 01).”  Brunnermeier and Nagel [2003, p. 2] ascribe a significant role to “hedge 
funds” who were “riding the technology bubble… [they] skillfully anticipated price 
peaks in individual technology stocks.”  
 
•  Market trading mechanism explanations. Ofek and Richardson [2003, Abstract] 
probe the role of short sale restrictions using a model where investors have 
heterogeneous beliefs.  In a study of 400 Internet stocks, they document “substantial 
short sale restrictions” and report a “link between heterogeneity and price effects.” 
Battalio and Schultz [2004, p. 4] examine whether short sale restrictions prevent 
rational investors from driving Internet stock prices to “reasonable levels.” They 
conclude that “As a whole, short-sale constraints were not responsible for the high 
prices of Internet stocks at the peak of the bubble.” 
 
•  Security analyst excess optimism. Liu and Song [2001, Abstract] argue that 
“financial analysts as a whole were too optimistic about Internet stocks before the 
market crash in April 2000… Analysts did indeed share some blame in the formation 
of the Internet stock bubble.” 
 
•  Company ownership structure/IPO restrictions on lockups. Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm [2003, Abstract] discuss the pre-IPO ownership structure of “dot-coms” and 
conclude that “it was firm characteristics that were unique during the ‘dot-com 
bubble’ and that pricing behavior followed from incentives created by these 
characteristics.” Schultz and Zaman [2001] examine manager share ownership and 
subsequent selling behavior to probe “overvaluation” of Internet companies going 
IPO.   
 
•  Corporate financial reporting induced. Coronado and Sharpe [2003, p. 2] examine 
whether pension plan accounting contributed to a “pension-induced bubble in equity 
prices.” They conclude that any pension-based misvaluation explains little of the 
runup on stock prices over the 1990s and 2000.  
 
•  Company growth prospects. Pastor and Veronesi [2004a, p. 31] examine how stock 
valuation models are affected by uncertainty about average profitability. They argue 
that “NASDAQ valuations were not necessarily irrational ex ante because uncertainty 
about average profitability, which increases the fundamental value of a firm, was 
unusually high in the late 1990s.” Using expectations data from I/B/E/S for selected 
Internet stocks, they demonstrate for twelve high technology firms how above average 
profitability can lead to sizable upward revaluations in stock price levels.   
 
Underlying many of the above hypotheses are statements or assertions about what 
actually occurred in U.S. capital markets in the period 1998-2001. There is often little 
detailed empirical analysis offered for the phenomena that the authors use to motivate their 
modeling or attempt to explain with their empirics. This paper systematically examines the 
period 1998-2001 using multiple data sets covering U.S. public and private markets. We 
observe positive associations between shifts in key public market/private venture capital 
market variables and fundamental company information. These associations warrant further 




equity valuation can be explained by fundamental information about company risk and 




II. Key Themes 
 
Our analyses highlight that there are five important themes that need to be taken 
into account by analytical modeling or empirical research that seeks to explain stock price 
movements in 1998-2001: 
 
1.  There was no single “bubble point” at which U.S. capital markets had an epiphany that 
valuations required a sharp downward re-evaluation.  Descriptions of U.S. capital 
markets in the 1998-2001 period often use a single index (NASDAQ) and highlight 
March 10, 2000 as the “high-point.” Analysis or observation using a single index 
inevitably ends up with the unsurprising conclusion that there was a single high point. 
We examine alternative ways to identify groups of companies that experienced sizable 
market capitalization shifts during 1998-2001. Using three-digit SIC codes, we 
identified four industry groups that had both (1) large relative increases and decreases in 
market capitalization and (2) large absolute market capitalizations—computer hardware, 
computer software, telecommunications, and biotech/pharmaceuticals. We demonstrate 
that in aggregate market capitalization computer software peaks on March 10, 2000, 
computer hardware and telecommunications on March 27, 2000, and biotech/pharma on 
December 28, 2000.  Also telling against the single “bubble point” conclusion is the 
finding that on September 30, 2000, computer hardware companies were at 100% of 
their March 30, 2000 levels whereas computer software companies were only at 75%.  
Computer hardware had a six-month later sustained downward revision in its public 
market stock price levels vis-à-vis computer software. There was not a common peak 
followed by simultaneous drops in the market capitalizations of different public market 
sectors. Similarly, the private venture capital market did not operate in the homogeneous 
way that an analysis of a single aggregate new funds invested series might imply. 
Rather, we find that aggregate private venture capital funding for new software ventures 
peaked in the March 2000 quarter while new communications and hardware ventures 
peaked in the September 2000 quarter. Our findings of different market capitalization 
peak points for sectors with identifiable differences in fundamental product/business 
characteristics suggest that an information-based explanation for stock price paths 
warrants serious consideration. 
 
2.  The sizable increases and decreases in market capitalization during 1998-2001 were not 
simply a NASDAQ-only phenomenon. We show that NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 
companies alike experienced increases and decreases in the hardware, software, 
telecommunications and biotech/pharma industries. One explanation for why observers 
mistakenly label the increases and decreases in market capitalization during 1998-2001 
as a “NASDAQ bubble” is that companies from industries such as computer software 
and hardware make up a much higher percentage of total exchange market capitalization 
on NASDAQ than on the NYSE/AMEX, so that comparable dollar movements in the 
market capitalization of such industries show up as larger relative movements for 
the NASDAQ index than for the NYSE/AMEX index. Analysis of aggregate market-
wide indexes is unlikely to be an effective way to identify sector-specific trends on stock 
exchanges like the NYSE and AMEX where other sectors such as banking/financial 
services, consumer products, oil and gas, and retail have large weightings. 
 
3.  The large shifts in market capitalizations during the 1998-2001 period were not 




built from a merger of Internet identifications of Thompson Financial Securities Data, 
Dealogic and IPOMonitor.com.
4 Such firms are almost exclusively listed on NASDAQ. 
On March 10, 2000, 96.2% of all Internet companies were on NASDAQ (97.8% 
weighting by market value of equity). The aggregate market capitalization of the 
Internet companies vis-à-vis NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX companies, partitioned into our 
“Selected SIC Industry group” of hardware/software/telecommunications/biotech-













The Internet company aggregate market capitalization decline, while larger as a 
percentage drop from its March 10, 2000 value than for our four SIC Industry groups 
(83% vis-à-vis 50%), is lower in aggregate dollar amount of the decline ($1,351 billion 
decline for Internet vis-à-vis $4,669 billion decline for the four Selected SIC Industry 
group). 
 
4.  Key sectors such as our Selected SIC Industry sample that were impacted in the 1998-
2001 period had a higher than average potential for large capital market appreciation and 
depreciation.  For example, two major capital market risk measures are (CAPM) beta 
and standard deviation of returns. In a capital asset pricing world, higher beta stocks 
have both higher risk and higher expected return. In an option pricing world, higher 
standard deviation of returns translates into both higher upside and higher downside 
returns.  The Selected SIC Industry sample had long exhibited higher capital market risk 
even  prior  to 1998-2001. The 90
th and 50
th percentiles on the distribution for the 














The explosive upside of successful companies in industries such as computer hardware 
and software is illustrated by Cisco Systems and Microsoft. Cisco listed in 1990 and by 
January 1, 1998 had a market capitalization of $61 billion and a market capitalization of 
$446 billion on March 10, 2000. Microsoft listed in 1986 and achieved the largest 
market capitalization status during the 1990s; on January 1, 1998 it had a market 
                                                 
















Internet Companies  $1,630  $279  ↓  $1,351  367 
NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX Companies         
•  Four Selected SIC Industries  $9,262 $4,593 ↓  $4,669  1,932 
•  All Other Companies  $9,135 $9,619      ↑   $484  6,469 
 
Beta  Standard Deviation of Returns 

















1980  1.867 1.084 1.539 0.704 0.044 0.029 0.042 0.024 
1985  2.147 0.872 1.416 0.552 0.041 0.022 0.036 0.018 
1990  1.768 0.677 1.362 0.423 0.072 0.029 0.055 0.021 
1995  2.090 0.746 1.333 0.353 0.053 0.024 0.037 0.016 
1996  1.990 0.965 1.167 0.354 0.047 0.024 0.035 0.016 





capitalization of $156 billion and on March 10, 2000 its market capitalization was $521 
billion.   
     
Accounting-based risk measures point to the same conclusion as beta and standard 
deviation of returns. For example, in 1980 there was less than a 10% chance that a 
publicly traded company would report negative net income. By 1997 this had grown to 
nearly 25% and in our Selected SIC Industries the shifts have been even more marked.  
In terms of revenue growth, for many years prior to 1998, the revenue growth 
distribution of the Selected SIC Industries exhibits fatter tails at both ends of the 
distribution vis-à-vis All Other Companies. The past track record would predict the 
Selected SIC Industries had the propensity in the 1998-2001 period for above average 
revenue growth potential at the 90
th percentile and above average revenue declines at the 
10
th percentile.   
 
Some of these results have antecedents in the accounting and finance literatures. For 
example, Hayn [1995], Collins, Pincus, and Xie [1999], and Joos and Plesko [2004] note 
the increasing left skewing of the net income distribution in that a larger percentage of 
the sample Compustat companies report negative net income.  Fama and French [2004] 
examine the changing characteristics of companies going IPO over the 1990-2001 
period. They report that the profitability of IPO firms has become “progressively more 
left skewed…toward lower profitability” (pp. 229-230).  They also note that the total 
asset growth of IPO companies has become “more right skewed… high growth” (p. 
230). They then conclude that this drift toward lower profitability and higher growth has 
meant lower survival rates for newly listed companies over time. 
 
5.  The period 1998-2001 saw marked increases in both revenue growth and net income 
growth at the top end of the distribution for the Selected SIC Industries vis-à-vis All 
Other Companies. At the bottom end of the distribution, the Selected SIC Industries had 
higher revenue declines and higher net income declines vis-à-vis All Other Companies.  
The Selected SIC Industries sector therefore exhibited characteristics of a “winner-take-
most” outcome in what were well above historical average increases in market size. 
   
The actual revenue growth rates during 1998-2001 for the Internet sample of companies 
at the top end were on a scale not observed before for either the All Other Companies 
















The 100%+ (1996), 200%+ (1997), 300%+ (1998), and 400%+ (1999) Internet company 
revenue growth rates at the 90th percentile for companies that went IPO post-1996 are 
strong indicators that the upside to these companies had a potential rarely seen before.   
     
Annual Revenue Growth Rates 













1996  200% 4% 119%  14% 72%  4% 
1997  324% -1% 132% 15% 75%  4% 
1998  401% 28% 136% 17%  69%  2% 
1999  469% 15% 180% 13%  65%  1% 
2000  729% 129% 278%  22%  78%  4% 





Finally, subsequent to 2000 there was a dramatic reduction in annual revenue growth 
rates for Internet companies and the Selected SIC Industry sample vis-à-vis (a) their 
own prior 1996-2000 rates, and (b) their prior above-average rates as compared to the 
All Other Companies sample. From a company fundamentals perspective, such 
reductions in revenue growth translate into lower company valuations, all else held 
equal. Skinner and Sloan (2002) highlight the sensitivities of stock price levels of 




III.  Samples  of Companies Examined 
 
Multiple samples of companies are examined in this paper. The aim is to examine 
both U.S. public capital markets and U.S. private venture capital markets. There is not one 
source that combines capital market and company fundamental information for both public 
and private markets.   
 
 
III-A.  Sample One: Publicly Traded Companies in Selected SIC Industries on NASDAQ 
and NYSE/AMEX 
 
Two commonly held views of U.S. capital markets in the period 1998-2001 is that 
(a) the rise and fall of stock prices was solely a NASDAQ related phenomenon, and (b) 
there was an extended rise followed by a sharp fall in March 2000. For example, Griffin, 
Harris, and Topaloglu [2003] refer to the “spectacular rise and fall of NASDAQ.” Pastor 
and Veronesi [2004a], after noting that the NASDAQ composite index closed at its all time 
high on March 10, 2000, comment that: 
 
“The unusual rise and fall in the prices of technology stocks has led many 
academics and practitioners to describe the event as a stock price ‘bubble’. This 
label seems appropriate as an ex post description of an extended rise in prices 
followed by a sharp fall.” (p. 1)  
 
Sample One enables us to probe whether the stock price rise/fall was specific only 
to NASDAQ or whether it was also present on other exchanges, and whether a small subset 
of industries accounted for an unduly large percentage of the high/low movement in market-
wide capitalization. 
 
Sample One comprises all publicly traded firms on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ exchanges. The focal set of companies are those in six three-digit SIC industry 
groups. Our sample selection procedure was designed to capture key industry groups that 
had both sizable increases and decreases in market capitalization during the 1998-2001 
period, and sizable market capitalizations at their peak (i.e., they were viewed as an 
economically significant sector by the capital markets).   
 
We first calculated the sequence of end-of-month aggregate market capitalizations 
from January 1998 to December 2001 of all companies in every three-digit SIC code. For 
each three-digit SIC industry, we then found the:  
 
(1)  High value of that three-digit SIC industry group’s market capitalization,  
(2)  Low value before the date of the high value but after January 1998, and  





From these, we calculated the ratio of high-to-low market capitalizations before the 
peak (from (1) and (2)) and after the peak (from (2) and (3)). The average of these two ratios 
measures the relative increase and decrease in aggregate value of the three-digit SIC 
industry group during the 1998-2001 period.  We next ranked all SIC industries using the 
average ratio and chose the top six industries with a peak individual aggregate market 
capitalization of at least $1 trillion.  These six SIC industries we put into four industry 
groups—computer hardware (SIC codes 357, 366 and 367), computer software (737), 
telecommunications (481), and biotechnology/pharmaceutical (283).      
 
Table 1 (Sample One) reports the aggregate market capitalization information (as 
of 1/1/1998, 3/10/2000, and 12/31/2001) and the number of companies (as of 3/10/2000) for 
the following groups: 
 
I.  All Companies 
 
II.  Pooled Selected SIC Industries (II.A + II.B + II.C + II.D) 
 
II.A.  Computer Hardware (357, 366, 367)
5 
II.B.  Computer Software (737)
6 
II.C. Telecommunications  (481)7 
II.D. Biotechnology/Pharmaceuticals  (283)
8 
 
III.  All Other Companies (in I. but not in II.) 
 
At the March 10, 2000 peak, our four industry groups comprised approximately 
50% of the total market capitalization of the NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX. NASDAQ firms 
made up 57.6% of the total market capitalization of NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX firms 
made up 42.4% of NYSE/AMEX total market capitalization.  For the four SIC groups, the 
percentages of NASDAQ market capitalization to the total industry market capitalization on 
NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX on 3/10/2000 are computer software (88.0%), computer hardware 
(57.6%), telecommunications (32.4%), and biotechnology/pharmaceuticals (24.9%).   
 
 
III-B.  Sample Two:  Publicly Traded Internet Companies 
 
The phrase “Internet boom” is often used to describe U.S. capital markets during 
the late 1990s. We examine Internet stocks using a database on Jay Ritter’s website (used in 
Loughran and Ritter [2004]). The database is built from a merging of “Internet 
identifications of Thompson Financial Securities Data, Dealogic, and IPOMonitor.com” 
(p.1).
9  To facilitate comparisons with our SIC industry analysis, we cross-classified the 
                                                 
5  The top five computer hardware companies according to market capitalization on March 10, 2000 are Cisco 
($446.1 billion), Intel Corp. ($401.5 billion), Lucent Technologies Inc. ($189.7 billion), IBM Corp. ($189.7 
billion), and Northern Electric Ltd. ($168.9).  
6  The top five computer software companies according to market capitalization on March 10, 2000 are 
Microsoft Corp. ($521.1), Oracle Systems Corp. ($231.7 billion), Yahoo Inc. ($96.1 billion), Veritas Software 
Corp. ($66.1 billion), and Compaq Computer Corp. ($48.6 billion). 
7  The top five telecommunication companies according to market capitalization on March 10, 2000 are AT&T 
Co. ($173.1 billion), Southwestern Bell Corp. ($143.3), MCI Worldcom, Inc. ($132.5), Bell Atlantic Corp. 
($89.0 billion), and Bell Tel Co. CDA ($78.6). 
8  The top five biotech/pharmaceuticals companies according to market capitalization on March 10, 2000 are 
Merck & Co. Inc. ($139.2 billion), Pfizer Chas & Co. Inc. ($135.5 billion), Bristol Myers Co. ($103.9 billion), 
Johnson & Johnson ($98.6 billion), and Warner Hudnut Inc. ($79.3 billion). 
9 There is no universally agreed upon definition of an Internet company. The finance literature approach 




Internet sample with our SIC based groupings. The overlap is strongest for computer 
software, computer hardware, and telecommunications industries. However, one other three 
digit SIC industry (738 – Miscellaneous Business Services) with 52 companies accounted 
for over 10% of the Internet sample. 
 
Table 1 (Panel B) lists the number of companies (as of March 10, 2000) and 
aggregate market capitalizations (as of March 10, 2000 and December 31, 2001) for three 
sets of Internet companies:    
 
I.  All Internet Companies 
 











III.  All Other Internet Companies (in I. but not in II.)
14 
  
The “All Other Internet Companies” group (III) consists of firms from many SIC 
industry groupings. However, no SIC industry group in (III) has more than 4% of the All 
Internet Companies group (I).   
      
The Internet sample is dominated by companies that went public after 1995.
15  In 
contrast, Sample One includes companies of many different IPO and age vintages. For 
example, Sample One includes Microsoft (IPO in 1986) and Yahoo! (IPO in 1996) while 
Sample Two includes Yahoo!, but not Microsoft.   
                                                                                                                                                      
does Schultz and Zaman [2001], Ljungqvist and Wilhem [2003], Ofek and Richardson [2003]. The samples in 
these papers ranged from 393 to 538. The accounting literature has relied heavily on InternetStockList™ 
(ISL), reported on www.internet.com. The ISL was billed by www.internet.com as a complete list of all 
publicly traded Internet stocks.  An Internet stock was operationally defined as a stock that existed because of 
the Internet – that is, had there been no Internet, the stock would not be in existence. Papers that use the ISL 
include Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2000), Demers and Lev (2001), Hand (2001), Bartov, Mohanram and 
Seethamraju (2002), Davis (2002), Demers and Lewellen (2003), Hand, (2003), and Keating, Lys and Magee 
(2003). Depending on whether the authors were targeting all Internet firms or just a subset (e.g., only B2C 
firms), the sample sizes these papers analyzed range between 55 and 261.   
10  The top five Internet-Computer Hardware companies according to market capitalization on March 10, 2000 
are Cisco Systems Inc. ($446.1 billion), Juniper Networks Inc. ($43.9 billion), Sycamore Networks Inc. ($40.1 
billion), Broadcom Corp. ($28.3 billion), and Foundry Networks Inc. ($22.4 billion). 
11  The top five Internet-Computer Software companies according to market capitalization on March 10, 2000 
are Yahoo Inc. ($96.1 billion), Exodus Communications Inc. ($30.3 billion), Ariba Inc. ($29.6 billion), 
Verisign Inc. ($27.5 billion), and Akamai Technologies ($27.1 billion). 
12 The top five Internet-Telecommunications companies according to market capitalization on March 10, 2000 
are Nextlink Communications Inc. ($9.3 billion), Covad Communications Group Inc. ($8.6 billion), Flag 
Technologies Holdings Ltd. ($4.1 billion), Northpoint Communications Group Inc. ($3.8 billion), and ITXC 
Corp. ($3.0 billion).  
13  The top five Internet-Miscellaneous Business Services companies according to market capitalization on 
March 10, 2000 are eBay Inc. ($25.2 billion), Freemarkets Inc. ($6.9 billion), Critical Path Inc. ($4.9 billion), 
Digital Island Inc. (3.9 billion), and Purchasepro.com Inc. ($3.9 billion). 
14  The top five Other Internet Companies according to market capitalization on March 10, 2000 are 
Priceline.com ($16.1 billion), Doubleclick Inc. ($10.6 billion), Verticalnet Inc. ($9.7 billion), Allegiance 
Telecom Inc. ($9.6 billion), and T.D. Waterhouse Group Inc. ($7.5 billion). 
15  The Internet list includes 4.1% that went IPO prior to 1996. One notable company included in the list is 




The Internet sample is almost exclusively traded on NASDAQ. On March 10, 
2000, 96.2% of the companies in Sample Two were listed on NASDAQ. They also made up 
97.8% of the total NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX Internet market capitalization on that date. 
 
 
III-C.  Sample Three:  VentureOne Sample of Privately-Held Venture-Backed Companies 
 
VentureOne is a commercial organization that collects and sells information about 
venture-backed companies and their investors. For each company included in its database, 
VentureOne reports information on financing rounds (such as dates of funding rounds, 
amounts raised, and pre-money valuations) as well as details about the company’s 
management and investors. Financial statement-based numbers (revenue and net income) 
are included in the database for a subset of these companies.  VentureOne’s database is at its 
most comprehensive starting in the early 1990s. Data are provided to VentureOne by 
companies and their investors on a voluntary basis. Where possible, VentureOne uses 
additional sources to verify the reported numbers (such as obtaining pre-money valuation 
numbers from the company itself, from individual investors, tracking business press reports 
on the company’s financing, and publicly available regulatory reports such as S1 filings 
with the SEC). VentureOne generously provided us with access to their comprehensive data 
file.     
      
VentureOne provides its own industry classifications (16 in total) for the 
companies in its database.  The top eight industry classifications cover 86.5% of the 13,765 
companies in the database. We use these eight industries as our Sample Three, grouping 
them into five broader industries: 
 
I.  All VentureOne Companies in Sample Three 
 
I.A Software 





Table 2 summarizes the composition of these VentureOne industry groups. Of the 
11,910 companies in Table 2, 1,262 had gone IPO by March 2005.  Table 2 also reports the 
number of these IPO companies that were also classified as Internet companies using the 
Sample Two Internet company listing (from Jay Ritter’s website). Approximately 20% of 






IV. Publicly Traded Companies in Selected Industries on NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX 
 






                                                 





IV-A.  Peak (High to Pre-Low and High to Post-Low) Market Capitalization Analysis 
      
Figure 1 plots the aggregate daily market capitalization of all stocks listed on the 
NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX exchanges.  The time period is January 1, 1990 to December 
31, 2004. Focusing on the 1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001 period, it is apparent that the NASDAQ 
stocks have the most marked increase in market capitalization followed by a dramatic 
decrease. Aggregate market capitalizations for selected times in the 1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001 










The ratio of the high value to the lowest value prior to the high in this period is 
4.23 for NASDAQ and 1.50 for NYSE/AMEX. The ratio of the high value to lowest value 
after the high in this period is 3.29 for NASDAQ and 1.35 for NYSE/AMEX. 
 
However, aggregate market ratios of High/Pre-low and High/Post-low mask 
several important industry-related differences. Table 3 (Panel A) presents summary statistics 
that show for our Sample One the I, II, II.A to II.D, and III groups: 
 
(a)  Ratio of High market capitalization to Pre-Low market capitalizations, 
(b)  Ratio of High market capitalization to Post-Low market capitalization; 
(c)  Market capitalization change (in $ billions) from Pre-Low to High, and  
(d)  Market capitalization change (in $ billions) from High to Post-Low. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents data that gives a more granular picture than Panel A.  
     
There are several noteworthy patterns in Table 3. First, NASDAQ always has 
higher ratios than NYSE/AMEX for both High to Pre-Low, and High to Post-Low. Second, 
there is strong evidence of a NYSE impact during the 1998-2001 period. Both the High to 
Pre-Low and High to Post-Low ratios on the NYSE/AMEX are higher for Selected SIC 
Industry groups than for the All Other Companies group.  Third, the dollar magnitude of the 
aggregate increase and decrease in market capitalization is highest for computer hardware. 
This increase and decrease for computer hardware is over $3 trillion each way for 
NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX. The dollar magnitude of the aggregate increase/decrease is higher 
on NASDAQ than NYSE/AMEX for computer hardware and computer software. It is 
higher on NYSE/AMEX than NASDAQ for telecommunications and biotechnology/ 
pharmaceuticals. 
      
Figure 2 plots the aggregate market capitalization of each of our four Selected SIC 
Industry groups (Groups II.A to II.D in Table 1—computer hardware, computer software, 
telecommunications, and biotech/pharma). These figures reinforce the inferences drawn 
from Table 3.  The increase/decrease occurs on the NYSE/AMEX for selected industries as 
well as for the NASDAQ. The Selected SIC Industries dominate the NASDAQ market 
capitalization, with approximately 80.0% on 3/10/2000 (66.9% on 12/31/2001). The 
consequence is that any sizable movements in these industries translate into sizable 
movements in the total NASDAQ index. In contrast, the Selected SIC Industries comprise 
only 31.3% of the NYSE/AMEX market capitalization on 3/10/2000 (23.7% on 



































12/31/2001). Even large movements in the Selected SIC Industries for NYSE/AMEX stocks 
result in less marked movements in the aggregate NYSE/AMEX indexes.   
      
Stories about capital market bubbles often include references to sharp falls in stock 
prices from a “peak level.” In contrast, informationally driven revaluations of stock prices 
are likely to be manifested through rolling changes as new information appears in a non-
synchronous fashion for individual companies or individual industries. Figure 3 and Table 4 
show what we term a Peak Market Capitalization Analysis. Figure 3 centers each of the 
Sample One groups on March 2000, which is the peak month for the NASDAQ index in the 
1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001 period.
17  The aggregate market capitalization at the close of March 
2000 is set at a value of 100. All other month-end aggregate capitalizations are expressed 
relative to the March 2000 value of 100. Table 4 shows end-of-month relative market 
capitalizations for all companies (I), the pooled Selected SIC Industries (II), the individual 
SIC industries (II.A to II.D), and the All Other Companies group (III).   
      
In the pre-March 2000 period, computer hardware and computer software show the 
most similarity in the “run-up” to their March 2000 level. Even for these two groups, 
however, differences are marked.  For example, December 1999 relative values are 64.1% 
for the NASDAQ computer hardware and 81.9% for the NASDAQ computer software 
groups.  Post March 2000, there are wide differences across the industry groups in their 
market capitalization declines. Six months after March 2000, computer hardware groups 
have relative values of 101.7% for NASDAQ and 97.5% for NYSE/AMEX. The computer 
software group has the most rapid decline in market capitalization following March 2000.  
By June 2000, this group had relative values of 71.6% for NASDAQ companies and 91.8% 
for NYSE/AMEX companies. We view this non-synchronous stock price movement across 
different industry groups as more consistent with a fundamental information driven re-
evaluation than a market epiphany that the “bubble has burst.” 
 
 
IV-B. Capital Market Risk Measures 
 
Risk-return notions are central to most asset pricing models in finance. The higher 
an asset’s risk, the higher its expected return. Two frequently used measures of a company’s 
capital market risk that are readily available in CRSP are the CAPM beta and the standard 
deviation of returns. 
     
Figure 4 plots the .9 (90
th), .7 (70
th), and .5 (50
th) deciles each year for each risk 
measure for our Selected SIC Industries group (II) and All Other Companies group (III). 
Combined, Groups II and III are all companies on NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX. The Selected 
SIC Industries group had higher relative market risk and higher total market risk than the 











                                                 
17  As of Spring 2005, the closing value on March 10, 2000 still represents the all-time high value for the 
NASDAQ composite index. 
Beta  Standard Deviation of Returns 

















1980  1.87 1.08 1.54 0.70  0.044  0.029  0.042  0.024 
1985  2.15 0.87 1.42 0.55  0.041  0.022  0.036  0.018 
1990  1.77 0.68 1.36 0.42  0.072  0.029  0.055  0.021 
1995  2.09 0.75 1.33 0.35  0.053  0.024  0.037  0.016 
2000  1.71 0.86 1.08 0.24  0.086  0.040  0.054  0.025 





These data highlight that before, during, and after the 1998-2001 period, our 
Selected SIC Industry group had sizably higher market relative risk and higher market total 
risk than all other companies. With this higher risk came the potential for very large 
increases in market capitalization and very large decreases in market capitalization. This is 
exactly what occurred in the 1998-2001 period. 
 
 
IV-C. Negative Net Income 
 
A fundamental indicator of company risk is the likelihood of reporting a loss. All 
else held equal, a firm with negative net income is less likely to generate funds for investing 
in new growth opportunities or to make distributions to its shareholders. The Selected SIC 
Industry group differs markedly from the “other sectors” in terms of its propensity for 
losses. Figure 5 presents the percentage of companies with negative net income (Compustat 
Data Item 172) each year from 1980 to 2003. Since 1980 there has been an increase in the 












The results for the All Companies column have been noted before by Hayn [1995], 
Collins, Pincus, and Xie [1999], and Joos and Plesko [2004]. Over time, the likelihood that 
a publicly-traded U.S. listed company will report a loss has increased. In 1980, there was 
less than a 10% chance in any one year, while by 2000 there was more than a 30% chance.
18  
      
Companies on NASDAQ have higher loss percentages than companies on the 













NASDAQ companies are, on average, smaller and younger than companies on the 
NYSE/AMEX. Size and age have been found to be useful predictors of financial distress 
[Altman, 2000].   
      
                                                 
18 The proposition that the percentage of losses has increased over time is supported by a univariate regression 









1980  8.3% 7.8% 8.4% 
1985  19.7% 29.9% 17.9% 
1990  25.6% 36.9% 23.2% 
1995  22.6% 38.8% 18.3% 
2000  31.5% 56.7% 22.6% 










1980  10.1% 7.8%  8.3% 
1985  24.3% 16.8% 19.7% 
1990  30.4% 22.1% 25.6% 
1995  28.0% 15.9% 22.6% 
2000  40.7% 18.7% 31.5% 





A key result in Figure 5 is that between 1982 and 2003, the average loss percentage 
for our Selected SIC Industries (Group II) consistently exceeded the average for the All 
Other Companies group (Group III). This holds for every year since 1980 for NASDAQ 
companies and for every year since 1985 for NYSE/AMEX companies. It is consistent with 
the Selected SIC Industry group having above-average company risk. In 2000, over 56.7% 
of the Selected SIC Industry Group reported negative net income compared to 22.6% for all 
other industry sectors. The biotechnology/pharmaceutical group has the highest individual 
loss percentage across our four industry groups. The differences between the higher loss 
percentages of each SIC industry group and the Other industry group are systematically 
higher in the post-1990 period than in the pre-1990 period. This is consistent with our 
Selected SIC Industry groups becoming relatively higher risk in the post-1990 period.   
 
  
IV-D. Revenue and Net Income Growth Distribution 
 
A company’s growth potential is of high interest to security analysts and other 
market observers. Revenue growth is one metric used to classify companies into different 
growth/non-growth categories. In this section we compare the distribution of revenue 
growth rates for our Selected SIC Industries with those of All Other Companies on 
NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX. In particular, we ask whether the Selected SIC industries had 
above average revenue growth.  For each group in Sample One (see Table 1), we computed 





th percentiles of 
the revenue growth rate distributions for the 1980 to 2003 period.  Several patterns are seen. 
     
First, both ends of the distribution plots are more extreme for the Selected SIC 
Industries. The Selected SIC Industries have higher positive growth rates at the 90
th 
percentile, and higher negative growth rates at the 10
th percentile. This is a systematic 
pattern that emerges well before 1998-2001.   
     
Second, there is a dramatic increase in revenue growth rates in the 1996-2000 














The 179.5% and 278.5% 90
th percentile growth rates are well above those in prior 
time periods and well above those of other companies in the same time period.   
      
Analysis of profitability of the Selected SIC Industry group is affected by the large 
percentage of negative net income observations. One approach is to compute the year to 
year change in net income.  This measure will be positive if (a) net income in the current 
year exceeds net income in the prior year, or (b) if the loss in the current year is less than the 
loss in the prior year. Figure 5 and Table 7 present distribution data pertaining to annual net 
income growth rates (deflated by market capitalization at the beginning of the period). 
There is less difference between the Selected SIC Industry group (II) and the All Other 
Pooled Selected  
SIC Industries 
All Other 






1980-1989 Average  67.0% 25.6%  45.1%  17.8% 
1990-1994 Average  70.6% 26.7%  48.4%  15.7% 
1995-1996 Average  115.5% 37.0% 64.9% 23.8% 
1997-1998 Average  134.1% 40.1% 72.2% 24.1% 
1999  179.5% 41.2% 65.3% 20.6% 
2000  278.5% 63.5% 77.8% 24.6% 





Companies group (III) for net income growth rates than for revenue growth rates. For the 
90















IV-E. Security Analysts 
 
Security analysts are often uncertain about a firm’s future income/earnings. One 
measure of this uncertainty is the standard deviation of the net income forecasts made by all 
security analysts submitting their forecast to I/B/E/S. The higher this measure, the greater 
the variation across analysts. Figure 8 plots key percentiles of the consensus dispersion 
measure (standard deviation scaled by beginning security price).
19  Figure 8 reports for 
Sample One the .9, .7, and .5 for the Selected SIC Industry group (II) and the All Other 
Companies group (III). The Selected SIC Industry group exhibits higher uncertainty among 
security analysts when forecasting next year’s net income.  
 
 
V. Publicly Traded Internet Companies 
 
V-A.  Peak (High to Pre-Low and High to Post-Low) Market Capitalization Analysis 
 
Figure 9 and Table 6 show the aggregate market capitalizations of our Internet 
sample (Sample Two in Table 1) over the period 1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001. The pooled 
Internet sample has a High-to-Pre-low ratio of 23.0 and a High-to-Post-low ratio of 10.1. 
These ratios are substantially larger than the equivalent ratios reported in Table 3 for 
Sample One (i.e., the Selected SIC Industry group). Three of the Selected SIC Industry 
subgroups have a reasonable number of observations in the Internet sample. The table below 
reports the ratios for the Sample Two companies in the SIC hardware, software, and 
telecommunications industries. We also report (from Table 3) the Sample One ratios for all 
companies in the designated industries. The ratios and dollar amounts of the Internet stock 
sample for the High-to-Pre-low and High-to-Post-low swings vis-à-vis the SIC Industry 








                                                 
19  The standard deviation of one-year-ahead earnings is measured four months after the end of the prior fiscal 
year.  This ensures that the prior years’ earnings have been announced and incorporated in analysts’ forecasts 
of the next year’s earnings.  This methodology is consistent with the analyst forecast dispersion literature. 
Year 
Pooled Selected 
SIC Industries (II) 
All Other 
Companies (III) 
1998  0.18 0.08 
1999  0.24 0.16 
2000  0.10 0.15 





















The above Sample Two Internet companies are a perfect subsample within each of 
the SIC Sample One industry groups. The Internet companies have far higher High to Pre-
Low, and High to Post-Low ratios. However, the dollar amounts of the market capitalization 
increases and decreases are lower for the Internet companies than for the “non-Internet” 
companies included in the SIC industry groups.   
 
Figure 10 and Table 7 present the Peak Market Capitalization Analysis, with March 
2000 set as the benchmark (100) for each Internet series. Note the differential behavior of 
the two dominant (in market capitalization) Internet sectors, namely computer hardware and 
computer software. This is especially apparent in the post March 2000 period.  In September 
2000, the computer hardware Internet companies have a benchmark value of 103.8 
compared to 62.8% for the computer software-Internet companies. The decline in market 
capitalization for Internet hardware stocks was delayed by over six months more than for 
Internet software stocks. By December 2000 (2001), Internet computer hardware companies 
were at 76.7% (26.8%) of their March 2000 levels.  In contrast, by December 2000 (2001) 
Internet software companies were at 30.2% (10.3%) of their March 2000 levels. This pattern 
of non-synchronous market capitalization declines across different industry sectors was also 
observed within the four Selected SIC Industries with Sample One. 
 
 
IV-B. Negative Net Income 
 
The Selected SIC Industry group in Sample One has a loss percentage above that of 
all other NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX companies. The Internet companies in Sample Two have, 
on average, even higher loss percentages than our Selected SIC Industries group. Figure 11 
reports loss percentages for the 1996 to 2003 period for All Internet Companies (I) and for 
the two subsamples described in Table 1 (Panel B) – the Internet SIC subsample (II) and the 
All Other Internet Companies subsample (III). Table 8 reports a comparison of negative net 
income percentages across Sample Two and Sample One.   
 
The number of Internet companies ranges from a low of 69 in 1996 to a high of 405 
in 1999. There are multiple potential explanations for the higher negative net income 
percentages for the Internet companies. One is that Internet companies are “investing” 
heavily to build a platform for future growth and profitability. Such investing could involve 
many costs that financial reporting rules will not allow companies to capitalize such as 
customer acquisition costs and brand-building costs. Another explanation is that the 
managers of Internet companies are relatively inexperienced and have not installed 
appropriate management control systems to ensure efficient and effective spending.   




Sample One  
SIC  
Sample 






A. Ratios        
Computer Hardware  13.49  4.84  7.75  3.84 
Computer Software  46.20  4.76  16.80  3.99 
Telecommunications 54.10  2.73  47.91  2.22 
        
B.  Market Capitalization Swings        
Computer Hardware  $687  $3,450  $647  $3,215 
Computer Software  $710  $1,978  $682  $1,813 





IV-C. Revenue Growth Distribution Analysis 
 
The Selected SIC Industry group in Sample One exhibited revenue growth rates 
significantly above all other companies on NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX over the 1980 to 2000 
period.  This growth rate increased substantially during 1999-2000. Our Internet sample of 
companies (Sample Two) has even higher actual revenue growth rates in each of the .7 and 
.9 deciles for two sub-samples of all NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX companies in Sample One – 
the Selected Pooled SIC group (II) and the All Other Companies group (III). Figure 12 
highlights this result by comparing the magnitude of the .9, .7, .5, .3, and .1 points of the 
revenue growth distribution for the Internet stock sample vis-à-vis several of the Sample 
One groups. The .9 decile and .1 decile blocks in Figure 12 highlight the high upside and 
high downside associated with the Internet companies in Sample Two, and the Selected SIC 
Industries vis-à-vis the All Other Companies in Sample One. There is a high level of 
variation in both the Internet companies and the Selected SIC Industries between the higher 
performers and the strugglers. There are revenue growth rates in the +100% and above 
range for the 90
th percentile and revenue decline rates in the -50% range at the 10
th 
percentile. 
      
In the late-to-mid 1990s this high growth rate of revenue for many Internet 
companies was often justified by scenarios in which growth was projected over an extended 
period. In Appendix A we present four illustrative case studies in this regard. The case 
studies leverage off of the: 
 
•  Internet facilitating a rapidly expanding online trading platform for commercial 
transactions in a highly efficient manner. eBay illustrates this scenario.   
 
•  Internet playing the role of a disruptive intermediary that would transfer 
customer purchases from established companies to new technology-centric, 
web-enabled startups. Amazon and Webvan illustrate this scenario. 
 
•  Internet creating the need for connectivity and security products for its 
individual and business users. Juniper Networks illustrates this scenario. 
 
All four companies mentioned above had rapid revenue growth, with differences in 
the timing of positive net income. eBay had positive net income at an early stage in its 
revenue ramp-up. Amazon incurred considerable losses in its early years as it attempted to 
build a sustainable revenue stream that was profitable. Webvan had a rapid revenue ramp-up 
in its short time as a publicly traded company. However, it never reported positive income 
in its 1999-2001 public market era and was delisted in July 2001. Juniper Networks had 
tremendous revenue growth up to March 10, 2001 and then struggled when industry-wide 
demand for their products decreased substantially; it achieved positive net income for six 
quarters up to March 2001 and then experienced large quarterly losses up to September 
2002. 
     
  The four companies in Appendix A are illustrative of the diverse types of 
businesses labeled as “Internet” and the widely varying outcomes that emerged in this sector 
with regard to: 
 
(a)  How quickly the revenue ramp-up occurred,  
(b)  How quickly positive net income was achieved (if at all), and  
(c)  How long the company survived.   
 
These revenue/net income plots are all drawn looking backwards. For a security 




to (a), (b), and (c).  The high growth rates of revenue by multiple Internet companies in the 
Figure 12 plots provided one important ground for differentiating Internet stocks from 
companies in many other more established industries and assigning the Internet stocks 




VI. Privately-Held Venture-Backed Companies 
 
Venture capital is a pivotal part of U.S. capital markets. A large number of now 
major publicly traded U.S. companies were funded with venture capital.  In this section we 
examine changes in the venture capital market in the pre-1998, 1998-2001, and post-2001 
periods. We first report data on funding trends. Then, for those firms that had an IPO, we 
examine fundamental information on the investee companies,
20 both in their private state 
and as public companies.  
 
Summary information on venture capital investments is regularly reported by both 
VentureOne and PWC MoneyTree. VentureOne generously provided us with access to their 
comprehensive database. We therefore examine aggregate quarterly funding data using both 
sources. Figure 13 plots aggregate quarterly venture capital investments from the March 
1992 quarter to the December 2004 quarter for companies tracked by VentureOne and PWC 
MoneyTree. Both VentureOne and PWC MoneyTree show similar trends, and the high 
degree of overlap in Figure 13 indicates that VentureOne strongly captures important 
venture capital financing trends in the 1992-2004 period.  
 
Figure 14 presents summary venture capital statistics on a per-venture-round basis. 
We report mean statistics for venture rounds A to G. Although all companies in the database 
received a Series A financing round (although not all companies may report that to 
VentureOne), a declining number of firms receive subsequent rounds of funding. There are 
many reasons for this “exiting” of firms from VentureOne’s database. One exit is an IPO, 
which happens for approximately 11% of firms. Another exit is the trade sale of a venture-
backed company. In some cases, this can occur even though there may be an attractive IPO 
opportunity (and in some cases it occurs after a S-1 registration statement for an IPO has 
been filed with the SEC).  In other cases, the trade sale can be for a company with little 
prospect of an IPO. Another “exit” is that the company does not raise another round of 
private financing. This may be because the company has turned cash flow positive and does 
not require more equity financing. Alternatively, it may be that the venture company has 
gone out of business. 
 
Figure 14 shows that the surge in venture capital funds invested in 1999 and 2000 
was employed via both (a) an increase in the number of deals (Panel A), and (b) an increase 
in the dollar amount invested per deal (Panel B).  The median pre-money valuation of the 
investee companies at each round in 1999 and 2000 was above pre-1999 deals and above 
post-2000 deals (Panel C).    
 
 
                                                 
20  An investee company is a company in which the venture capital firms (the investor) invests. Venture-
backed private companies raise financing via a negotiation between the management/board of the early stage 
(investee) company and one or more venture capital (investor) companies. Two key issues in this negotiation 
are the valuation of the investee company at the time new financing is arranged (termed pre-money valuation) 
and the amount of financing to be provided by the investor. The first (second, third,…) round of private 
funding is (are) referred to as Series A (B,C,…). The pre-money valuation plus the amount of new financing is 




VI-A. High to Pre-Low and High to Post-Low Venture Funding 
 
The private equity market does not provide frequent daily and intra-day 
revaluations of company market capitalizations as do the public equity markets. The mean 
(median) time between successive rounds of private financing (and therefore revaluations) 
for our VentureOne sample is 466 (358) days.   
      
One indicator of private investor interest in different sectors is the dollar amount of 
new venture capital investment in that sector. Figure 15 and Table 8 use the Peak Venture 
Capital Funding Analysis, akin to Table 4 and Figures 3 and 10, to express each quarter’s 
new venture capital investment relative to the 2000 Quarter 1 investment level. 2000 
Quarter 1 is the high point of aggregate venture investment in the VentureOne database (and 
the PriceWaterhouse database). This Peak Venture Capital Funding Analysis highlights that 
venture capital interest had a sector-by-sector re-evaluation in 2000, rather than an across–
the-board drop due to a “bubble bursting” in March 2000. The Software (I.A) and Consumer 
Business Services (I.B) sectors have large declines in new investments in the June and 
September quarters of 2000. In contrast, the communications, biopharmaceutical and 
hardware/equipment sectors have a higher level of new investments in the September 2000 
quarter vis-à-vis the March 2000 quarter.   
 
 
VI-B. Revenue Growth Distribution 
 
Venture capitalists typically expect early stage companies to achieve one or more 
milestones before they agree to reinvest in subsequent financing rounds. Among milestones, 
revenue growth is one of the most important (often the most important). The VentureOne 
database includes revenue and net income information for companies going IPO. We now 
examine this fundamental company information. Our goal is to shed light on whether the 
venture backed companies in the 1998-2001 period were different as regards revenue 
growth relative to venture-backed companies in other periods. We first use a calendar time 
analysis to analyze revenue growth at successive financing rounds (A, B, C, etc.). We then 
use an event time analysis for venture-capital backed companies that had an IPO.   
 
 
VI-B-1. Calendar Time Analysis 
    
One approach to examining revenue growth in private equity investments is to 
compare revenue growth rates for companies at comparable financing rounds. We examine 
the first four financing rounds (A, B, C and D). As noted previously, there is a decline in the 
number of companies in successive rounds of financing.  Figure 16 presents the .1, .3, .5, .7 
and .9 revenue growth distribution percentiles for each round examined. The data pertain to 
venture-backed companies’ revenue growth prior to their going public. We report separate 
data for three time periods: companies with an IPO in 1990-1994, an IPO in 1995-1997, and 
an IPO in 1998-2000. The general trend in the .9 and .7 deciles over the three sub-periods is 
an increase in the annual revenue growth over successive financing rounds.  The magnitude 
of the revenue growth rates for 1998-2000 IPOs are much higher than those reported in 
Figure 12 for the publicly traded Sample One companies. The .9 decile revenue growth rates 
are 339% (Series A), 448% (Series B), 716% (Series C), and 696% (Series D). 
 
 
VI-B-2. Event Time Analysis 
 
In this analysis we define each firm’s IPO year as Year 0 and compute the firm’s 




as a public company. Thus, Year 0 is the IPO year. Figure 17 plots the revenue growth rates. 
One general pattern unrelated to 1998-2001 is that Year 0 is most likely to have the highest 
revenue growth rate. Figure 17 also highlights that companies going IPO in the 1998-2000 
period had a faster ramp-up in revenue growth rates for the .9 and .7 deciles. The scales on 
the .9 percentile block (0% to 1000%) and the .7 percentile (0% to 500%) are well above 
those achieved by a random cross-section of publicly traded companies. Figure 17 also 
highlights that the companies going IPO in the 1998-2000 period were demonstrably 
stronger as regards annual revenue growth rates in their pre-IPO private capital market years 
vis-à-vis those going public in the 1990-1994 and 1995-1997 periods. 
      
The Internet sample of companies analyzed previously in this paper also exhibit 
marked differences in their early-stage public market fundamentals. The largest sample of 
Internet IPOs occurs in the period 1996-2000. Figure 18 presents the event time analysis in 
Figure 17 for two perfect subsamples of the VentureOne set of companies with an IPO in 
the 1996-2000 period—an Internet IPO sample and an IPO sample where companies were 
not classified as being Internet-related.  The results reinforce the prior evidence that Internet 
companies experienced much higher annual revenue increases in their pre-IPO capital 
market era than observed for non-Internet companies for the same time period or in prior 
time periods. 
      
Many venture capital firms have a very high weighting of their portfolio of 
investments in the four industry sectors we independently identified as the focus of Sample 
One. We documented in Section IV the higher capital market risk of our Selected SIC 
Industries. Venture capital arose in large part to invest in ventures for which traditional 
debt-based financing was unavailable (or minimally available). Venture capital returns 
typically have a highly (right) skewed distribution – a small percentage of investments 
return a very high percentage of total venture fund portfolio return. The results in Section VI 






In this paper we have scrutinized the behavior of U.S capital markets during 1998-
2001 through the previously ignored lens of underlying company financial fundamentals. 
Specifically, we have examined the ability of company fundamentals to directionally 
explain changes in stock price levels, both in U.S. public equity markets and in U.S. private 
venture capital markets. Our analyses highlighted key empirical findings that need to be 
taken into account by analytical modeling or empirical research that seeks to explain stock 
price movements in 1998-2001. 
 
1.  Industry groups such as computer software, computer hardware, 
telecommunications, and biotech/pharma differ in the timing and magnitude of 
the upward and downward re-evaluations of their stock prices in U.S. public 
capital markets in the period 1998-2001. U.S. private venture capital markets 
likewise exhibit variations across sectors in new investment funding peak 
levels. Such differential behavior makes it more likely that an information-
based explanation is deserving of deeper investigation.  Information about the 
future growth and profitability of companies frequently comes at different 
points in time. At the industry level, key analyst reports, government releases, 
etc. rarely occur simultaneously for all industries. One challenge in pursuing 
this information-based explanation is to identify the key information events 
that led to revaluations. Many of these information releases may be at the 





2.  One proposed hypothesis for the NASDAQ decline in early 2000 is that 
investors finally realized (had an epiphany) that a large number of publicly 
traded companies had little substance (the “emperor had no clothes” 
discovery). This hypothesis does not explain why the sustained decline in 
computer software stocks started in March 2000 while the computer hardware 
sector had sustained declines starting in September 2000. Attempts to 
rehabilitate this explanation by positing multiple bubbles (and their discovery 
at different times) raise questionable issues of investor segmentation. How and 
why are investors who detect a “computer software” bubble in March 2000 
segmented from those who detect a “computer hardware” bubble six months 
later in September 2000?  
 
The analysis across our three samples highlights the diversity in how the 
capital market rose and fell between 1998 and 2001 in the sense that for a 
designated set of industries we showed that: 
 
• It occurred across the NYSE/AMEX as well as the NASDAQ, 
• It occurred for established companies as well as recent IPO companies, and  
• It occurred for Internet companies and for non-Internet companies. 
 
This diversity has implications for several proposed explanations that assume 
the rise/fall behavior was far narrower than we document. For example, IPO-
related explanations such as lockup constraints with recent IPOs will need to 
explain the rise/fall pattern observed for many companies listed well before 
1998. Explanations focusing on Internet/dot.com companies need to explain 
why the rise/fall patterns were observed for a large number of companies that 
were not characterized as “Internet/dot.com.” 
 
3.  Some critiques of 1998-2001 capital markets have a strong ex post bias or 
hindsight tone to them. Capital markets price assets looking forward with 
varying degrees of visibility as to future revenue, profitability, and growth. The 
selected SIC Industry sample and the Internet sample exhibited revenue growth 
rates in the 1998-2000 period that were abnormally high by historical 
standards. Thus, there were contemporaneous grounds for supra-normal growth 
prospects of a select set of companies. Finding that after the fact many of these 
companies did not sustain their abnormally high growth rates does not 
invalidate the reasonableness of above normal growth expectations in the 
1998-2000 period. 
 
4.  The risk-reward notion is a lynchpin of much asset pricing and valuation. The 
Selected SIC Industries by sample design had the largest relative 
increase/decrease in market capitalization in the 1998-2001 period. For many 
years up to and including 1998, these industries had well above average 
relative market risk (beta) and well above average absolute market risk 
(standard deviation). Moreover, at a company fundamentals level, these 
industries had extreme behavior as regards revenue growth increases and 
revenue growth decreases prior to 1998. This profile would predict that any 
capital market movements in 1998-2001 would be higher than those of many 
other companies on the rise and more severe than many other companies on the 
decline. The large relative increases and decreases in the market capitalization 
of U.S. capital markets in 1998-2001may well have more grounding in risk-











This Appendix profiles four companies that illustrate different revenue and net 
income growth profiles of Internet companies.   
 
eBay: eBay (short for Echo Bay Technologies) was founded by Pierre Omidyar 
and Jeff Skoll in Silicon Valley in May 1996 as a place for “practically anybody to sell 
practically anything on earth.” It was a trading platform that used the Internet to facilitate 
transactions between buyers and sellers. Every quarter since 1997 it has experienced 
revenue growth.  eBay operates with a business model which has multiple revenue sources 
(listing fees and transaction fees are two of the major ones) and has acquired a transaction 
financing capability (Paypal) that adds another revenue stream.  It has expanded its trading 
platform to facilitate transactions by business and individual consumers and across multiple 
geographies. It went IPO on September 9, 1998 after two rounds of venture capital 
financing. The Series A raised $3 million at a pre-money value of $27 million, while the 
Series B raised $2 million.  The pre-money valuation at the IPO date was $740 million.    
 
Amazon.com: Founded in 1994 by Jeff Bezos, in Seattle, as the “Earth’s Biggest 
Bookstore.” Its stated mission initially was to be the leading online bookseller. Using its 
own warehouse, it shipped books around the globe to its customers, who ordered online. It 
subsequently expanded its product offerings to include a broader selection – such as music, 
toys, computers, video games, and electronic goods. It went IPO on May 15, 1997 after one 
round of venture capital financing. The Series A raised $8 million. The pre-money valuation 
at the IPO date was $450 million. 
 
Webvan: Founded in Silicon Valley in December 1996 by Louis Borders and 
Kevin Czinger to enable on-line purchase and home delivery of grocery products. It 
subsequently expanded its product offering to include other products such as flowers. It 
established its own physical infrastructure – both high technology-based warehouses to store 
and pick products, and delivery vans. By 2001 it was delivering in Chicago; Los Angeles; 
Orange County, California; Portland, Oregon; San Diego; San Francisco; and Seattle. It 
went IPO on November 5, 1999 after four rounds of venture capital financing – Series A 
(raised $10.7 million), B ($35.3 million), C ($120 million), and  D ($275 million). The pre-
money valuation at the IPO date was $6,051 million. It closed operations in July 2001 after 
a cash-burn rate of over $200 million per year and never making positive net income in any 
quarter. 
 
Juniper Networks: Founded in February 1996, the company develops and 
manufactures integrated silicon- and software-based wide area network (WAN) switching 
systems. The company has expanded its network infrastructure offerings to also include 
network security products and applications.  Juniper had rapid sales growth in its early years 
and posted positive (quarterly) net income by the end of its fourth year.  The company 
completed four rounds of venture capital financing prior to its public offering – Series A 
(raised $2 and pre-money valuation of $7 million), Series B (raised $9.2 million and pre-
money valuation of $23.6 million), Series C (raised $46 million and pre-money valuation of 
$32.8 million), and Series D (raised $34 million and pre-money valuation of $500 million). 
The company completed a $163.2 million IPO on June 24, 1999 and had a pre-money 
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Publicly Traded Aggregate Market Capitalizations of All Companies on NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX:  
1/1/1990 to 12/31/2004 
 
 












































































































































































Publicly Traded Aggregate Market Capitalizations of Selected SIC Industries  
(Computer Hardware; Computer Software; Telecommunications; Biotech/Pharma)  
on NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX:  1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001 
 











































































































































































Peak Market Capitalization Analysis:  Aggregate Market Capitalizations for  
All Companies (I), Selected SIC Industries Pooled (II), and All Other Companies  
Benchmarked Relative to March 2000 Market Capitalization:  1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001 
 
























































Monthly Value as a Fraction of Value During March, 2000 













































































Monthly Value as a Fraction of Value During March, 2000 













































































Monthly Value as a Fraction of Value During March, 2000 

















































































Peak Market Capitalization Analysis:  Aggregate Market Capitalizations for  
Selected SIC Industry Groups (II.A to II.D)  
Benchmarked Relative to March 2000 Market Capitalization:  1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001 
 
























































Monthly Industry Value as a Fraction of Industry Value During March, 2000 for 













































































Monthly Industry Value as a Fraction of Industry Value 













































































Monthly Industry Value as a Fraction of Industry Value 

















































































Capital Market Risk Measures for Publicly Traded Companies:   
Select Percentiles of Annual Beta and Standard Deviation of Daily Returns  
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Percentage of Firm-Years with Negative Net Income:   
Publicly Traded Companies on NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX:  1980 – 2003 
 

























































Percentage of Firm Years with Negative Net Income for Pooled 
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th):   
Publicly  Traded Companies on NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX:  1980 to 2003 
 
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  Figure 7A 






th) for All Exchanges:  1980 to 2003 
 
 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Select Percentiles of Standard Deviation of Analysts’ Earnings Per Share  
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Publicly Traded Aggregate Market Capitalization of  
Internet Sample:  1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001 
 























































Aggregate Market Capitalization of Internet Companies:
  1/1/1998 to 12/31/2001
Date:  March 10, 2000 


































Aggregate Market Capitalization of Internet Companies 
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Peak Market Capitalization Analysis:  Aggregate Market Capitalizations for Selected SIC Internet 
Industries (II.A to II.D) and All Other Internet Companies (III) Benchmarked 
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Annual Revenue Growth Rates:  1996-2003 
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Private Venture Capital Quarterly Investments – 1992, Quarter 1 to 2004, Quarter 4:  VentureOne and 






















































Comparison of Aggregate Funding by Year and Quarter 












































Funding by Quarter for Top Five VentureOne 











































U.S. Private Venture Capital Market Trends:  1992 – 2004 
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Private Venture Capital Market Funding for Top Five VentureOne Industry Groupings  


























Funding by Quarter Relative to 2000Q1 for Top Five VentureOne 
























































































































Annual Revenue Growth Percentiles for Private Venture Backed Companies – Calendar 




















































































































































Annual Revenue Growth Percentiles for Private Venture Backed Companies – Event Time 





























































































































Annual Revenue Growth Percentiles for Private Venture Backed Companies – 
Event Time Analysis (IPO in Year 0) for VentureOne Internet Companies 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Description of Privately Held Company Sample 













With IPO (c) 
I.  All Venture One Companies (in  Sample Three) 
 
11,910 1,262 239 
     I.A.  Software (a)  4,811  388  134 
     I.B.  Consumer-Business Services  2,272  127  48 
     I.C.  Communications  1,604  195  53 
     I.D.  Biopharmaceuticals  1,008  231  0 
     I.E.  Hardware / Equipment (b)  2,215  321  4 
 11,910 1,262 239 
      
(a)  Comprises the “Software” and “Information Services” Industry Segments of VentureOne. 
(b)  Comprises the “Medical Devices,” “Electronics,” and “Semiconductors” Industry Segments of 
VentureOne. 
(c)  The Internet company list (taken from Jay Ritter’s website) is combined with the VentureOne listing 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Benchmarked Market Capitalization of End-of-Month Values Relative to March 2000 

















































































6/1998  8% 9%  13%  5% 5%  1%  4% 
12/1998  16% 16%  22%  12%  5% 18%  11% 
6/1999  29% 26%  32%  20% 33%  33%  58% 
7/1999  31% 28%  33%  22% 39%  31%  61% 
8/1999  31% 29%  35%  22% 33%  28%  57% 
9/1999  34% 33%  37%  28% 33%  34%  56% 
10/1999  42% 40%  43%  37% 37%  37%  65% 
11/1999  57% 55%  55%  54% 54%  64%  83% 
12/1999  71% 70%  64%  75% 55%  85%  85% 
1/2000  76% 75%  70%  79% 73%  84%  90% 
2/2000  88% 88%  86%  90% 94%  79%  89% 
3/2000  100% 100%  100%  100% 100%  100%  100% 
4/2000  81% 81%  93%  71% 78%  73%  79% 
5/2000  72% 72%  89%  58% 60%  59%  65% 
6/2000  73% 74%  93%  59% 58%  60%  61% 
7/2000  81% 82%  101%  66% 59%  72%  63% 
8/2000  79% 81%  104%  63% 50%  69%  56% 
9/2000  80% 82%  104%  63% 50%  72%  57% 
10/2000  67% 69%  89%  52% 43%  64%  42% 
11/2000  61% 64%  85%  45% 40%  51%  36% 
12/2000  50% 52%  77%  30% 25%  37%  24% 
6/2001  22% 22%  30%  13%  9% 33%  27% 
12/2001  19% 19%  27%  10%  3% 32%  18% 
             
3/2000 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Peak Venture Funding Benchmark Analysis of Quarterly Venture Capital Funding for Five Select  






























 *  Denotes amount of funding in 2000, Quarter 1 in billions of dollars. 


















1998,Q1  0.15  0.13 0.06 0.23  0.25 0.23 
1998,Q2  0.19  0.17 0.07 0.29  0.30 0.33 
1998,Q3  0.17  0.18 0.07 0.22  0.25 0.27 
1998,Q4  0.14  0.14 0.09 0.15  0.20 0.25 
1999,Q1  0.20  0.27 0.12 0.17  0.24 0.26 
1999,Q2  0.43  0.49 0.25 0.55  0.43 0.49 
1999,Q3  0.44  0.50 0.39 0.43  0.29 0.49 
1999,Q4  0.77  0.74 0.69 1.01  0.49 0.71 
2000,Q1  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 
2000,Q2  0.82  0.86 0.66 0.83  1.13 1.07 
2000,Q3  0.86  0.69 0.61 1.16  1.77 1.04 
2000,Q4  0.62  0.52 0.41 0.81  1.08 1.01 
2001,Q1  0.38  0.34 0.18 0.51  0.61 0.71 
2001,Q2  0.30  0.25 0.15 0.36  0.54 0.79 
2001,Q3  0.24  0.19 0.13 0.25  0.57 0.60 
2001,Q4  0.24  0.20 0.11 0.24  0.70 0.65 
           
2000,Q1












eBay Amazon  Webvan  Juniper  Networks  Qtr. 
Ended  Sales  Net Inc.  Sales  Net Inc.  Sales  Net Inc.  Sales  Net Inc. 
12/95     0.51  -0.30       
3/96     0.88  -0.33       
6/96     2.23  -0.77       
9/96     4.17  -2.38       
12/96  0.37  0.15  8.47  -2.30       
3/97  0.60  0.19  16.00  -3.04       
6/97  1.05  0.29  27.85  -7.53       
9/97  1.46  0.20  37.89  -9.65       
12/97  2.63  0.19  66.04  -10.81    0.00  -10.36 
3/98  13.99  1.44  87.36  -10.37    0.00  -3.90 
6/98  19.48  2.73  115.98  -22.58  0.00  -3.30  0.00  -7.20 
9/98  21.73  0.46  153.65  -45.17  0.00  -3.23  0.00  -10.58 
12/98  30.93  2.64  252.89  -46.43  0.00  -5.46  3.81  -9.28 
3/99  42.80  3.76  293.64  -61.67  0.01  -11.69  10.04  -6.67 
6/99  49.48  0.82  314.38  -138.01  0.38  -23.44  17.56  -3.85 
9/99  58.52  0.17  355.78  -197.08  3.84  -60.44  29.56  -1.59 
12/99  73.92  4.81  676.04  -323.21  9.07  -49.00  45.44  3.08 
3/00  85.89  1.76  573.89  -308.42  16.27  -57.81  63.89  8.07 
6/00  98.15  7.46  577.88  -317.18  25.94  -74.36  113.03  19.62 
9/00  113.38  15.21  637.86  -240.52  52.06  -147.97  201.20  58.07 
12/00  134.01  23.86  972.36  -545.14  84.19  -173.13  295.39  62.16 
3/01  154.09  21.07  700.36  -234.13  77.23  -216.97  332.10  58.57 
6/01  180.90  24.61  667.63  -168.36      202.18  -37.13 
9/01  194.42  18.84  639.28  -169.87     201.70  -29.73 
12/01  219.40  25.93  1115.17  5.09     151.03  -5.13 
3/02 
6/0 
245.11  47.58  847.42  -23.15     122.22  -46.00 
6/02  266.29  54.31  805.60  -93.55     117.04  6.23 
9/02  288.78  61.00  851.30  -35.08     152.03  -88.33 
12/02  413.93  87.00  1428.61  2.65     155.27  8.45 
3/03 
6 
476.49  104.19  1083.56  -10.12     157.21  3.68 
6/03  509.27  91.87  1099.91  -43.31     165.10  13.58 
9/03  530.94  103.25  1134.46  15.56     172.13  7.20 
12/03  648.39  142.46  1945.77  73.15     206.95  14.73 
 